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ABERRANT REWARD CENTER RESPONSE TO PARTNER
REPUTATION DURING A SOCIAL EXCHANGE GAME IN
GENERALIZED SOCIAL PHOBIA
Chandra Sripada, M.D., Ph.D.,1 Michael Angstadt, B.S.,1 Israel Liberzon, M.D.,1,2,3 Kevin McCabe, Ph.D.,4 and
K. Luan Phan, M.D.5,6∗
Objective: Generalized social anxiety disorder (GSAD) is characterized by ex-
cessive fear of public scrutiny and reticence in social engagement. Previous studies
have probed the neural basis of GSAD often using static, noninteractive stimuli
(e.g., face photographs) and have identified dysfunction in fear circuitry. We
sought to investigate brain-based dysfunction in GSAD during more real-world,
dynamic social interactions, focusing on the role of reward-related regions that
are implicated in social decision-making. Methods: Thirty-six healthy individu-
als (healthy control [HC]) and 36 individuals with GSAD underwent functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) scanning while participating in a behavioral
economic game (“Trust Game”) involving iterative exchanges with fictive part-
ners who acquire differential reputations for reciprocity. We investigated brain
responses to reciprocation of trust in one’s social partner, and how these brain
responses are modulated by partner reputation for repayment. Results: In both
HC and GSAD, receipt of reciprocity robustly engaged ventral striatum, a region
implicated in reward. In HC, striatal responses to reciprocity were specific to part-
ners who have consistently returned the investment (“cooperative partners”), and
were absent for partners who lack a cooperative reputation. In GSAD, modula-
tion of striatal responses by partner reputation was absent. Social anxiety severity
predicted diminished responses to cooperative partners. Conclusion: These re-
sults suggest abnormalities in GSAD in reward-related striatal mechanisms that
may be important for the initiation, valuation, and maintenance of cooperative
social relationships. Moreover, this study demonstrates that dynamic, interactive
task paradigms derived from economics can help illuminate novel mechanisms of
pathology in psychiatric illnesses in which social dysfunction is a cardinal feature.
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INTRODUCTION
Generalized social anxiety disorder (GSAD), also
known as generalized social phobia, is characterized by
exaggerated and pervasive fear, and avoidance of scrutiny
by others. GSAD is very common,[1] typically origi-
nates prior to adolescence, foretells significant func-
tional impairment and psychiatric comorbidity including
other anxiety, mood and substance abuse/dependence
disorders, and rarely remits without treatment.[2–4] In-
dividuals with GSAD exhibit a number of cognitive bi-
ases/distortions relevant to initiation and maintenance of
ongoing social relationships,[5] including attention and
memory bias for signals of threat,[6–8] misattribution,
and/or expectation bias for negative outcomes.[9–11] Pre-
vious studies have probed the neural basis of GSAD pri-
marily using tasks with noninteractive stimuli (e.g., face
photographs) and have implicated fear-related neurocir-
cuitry, especially the amygdala.[12] However, the neuro-
circuitry of GSAD in the context of a more real-world
dynamic, social interaction remains largely unexplored.
In parallel, the emerging fields of neuroeconomics and
social cognitive neuroscience[13–15] are increasingly un-
covering the brain mechanisms involved in motivation
to trust in social partners, form social networks, keep
track of reputations, and experience rewards from oth-
ers who are cooperative and fair.[16, 17] Accumulating ev-
idence suggests that the brain’s reward system, and in
particular ventral striatum (vSTR), plays a key role in
supporting cooperative social relationships.[13, 18] vSTR
not only plays a critical role in reward and motivation
generally,[19, 20] but also displays preferential sensitivity
for outcomes that are fair and equitable between social
partners.[18, 21] VSTR is also implicated in decoding the
reputations of others based on prior actions,[22] and using
this reputational information to bias subsequent emo-
tions and social decisions.[16, 17, 22, 23] In a previous report
with healthy participants,[24] we used the Trust Game,
an economic exchange game that mimics real-life deci-
sions in that gains from cooperation must be balanced
against risks from partners’ defection, and demonstrated
that vSTR reward signals are modulated by partner rep-
utation. In particular, we found vSTR responses to part-
ner reciprocation are amplified with social partners with
a prior reputation for cooperation versus partners with
a reputation for defection, and other groups have con-
firmed these findings.[25, 26] These results suggest vSTR
modulation by partner reputation might be a poten-
tially important mechanism for initiating and sustain-
ing cooperative relationships. If so, the natural question
arises whether this mechanism might be dysregulated
in GSAD and other neuropsychiatric illnesses in which
social dysfunction is a cardinal feature.
Using a social neuroeconomics approach, we pre-
sented 36 adults with GSAD and 36 matched healthy
control (HC) individuals with a Trust Game modified
into an iterative format for functional magnetic reso-
nance imaging (fMRI). We sought to uncover abnor-
malities in GSAD in vSTR-mediated reward functioning
during ongoing dynamic social exchange. Based on prior
data and theory, we predicted that relative to psychiatri-
cally HCs, the GSAD group would exhibit differences in
vSTR responses to reciprocity and/or reputation.
METHOD
SUBJECTS
Thirty-six right-handed individuals with GSAD (21 females; mean
age and SD 27.0 ± 7.6 years) and 36 right-handed HCs (22 females;
mean age and SD 29.5 ± 8.3 years) participated in this study. Af-
ter the nature of the procedures was explained, all subjects provided
informed consent. Social anxiety disorder, generalized subtype, was
assessed with DSM-IV criteria as confirmed by the Structured Clini-
cal Interview for DSM-IV and Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale (LSAS,
mean 76.9 ± 16.7). Entry criteria and other clinical characteristics of
GSAD participants are described in the Supporting Information.
TRUST GAME TASK
The fMRI task involved an event-related design (Fig. 1) previ-
ously detailed.[24] Participants played the role of an investor (“Decision
Maker 1” [DM1]) who must decide whether or not to invest 20 mone-
tary units (MU) to a trustee partner (“Decision Maker 2” [DM2]). If the
investor chooses to “keep” the money (not invest), the money is evenly
split and each person receives 10 MU with certainty. But if the investor
chooses to invest the money (“trust”), the money is doubled (40 MU)
and the trustee can then choose to either “reciprocate” by sending
back half the money to the investor, or “defect” by retaining the en-
tire amount thereby sending nothing back to the participant (0 MU).
A key manipulation was that investors played in repeated interactions
with three different fictive partner types, each associated with different
tendencies for reciprocity which were unknown to the participant at
the start of the experiment. Unbeknownst to the participants, the fre-
quency of reciprocity was actually fixed at the following frequencies:
(1) “COOPERATIVE” partner = 75%; (2) “UNCOOPERATIVE”
partner = 25%; and (3) “NEUTRAL” partner = 50%. This task ma-
nipulation forces participants to learn the tendencies of their partners
to reciprocate (based on prior interactions with that partner) in order
to maximize personal gains. An additional “COMPUTER” partner
was included, which did not require real-time learning of reputation
(participants were told ahead of time this partner reciprocates 50% of
the time) and served as a nonsocial control.
At the start of each trial (Fig. 1B), participants viewed one of three
different obscured face photographs representing a DM2 type or they
viewed an image of a computer. The color of the oval designated the
type of DM2 and participants were not aware of the mapping between
color of oval and type of DM2 at the start of the experiment—they
had to learn the mapping during the task. The DM2/computer image
appeared for 4 s during which the participants were instructed to make
their choice (KEEP or TRUST) by button press. In real-time and
based on the subject’s own decision/choice, feedback was provided
immediately in the form of a DM2/computer image reappearing for
2 s along with information about the participant’s choice, as well as
the DM2’s actual (in instances of DM1 TRUST) or hypothetical (in
instances of DM1 KEEP) response.
There were a total of 80 trials equally representing the three types
of DM2s and the computer (i.e., 20 trials of each). Trials were semi-
randomly presented with a 0–12 s jittered intertrial interval, and dis-
tributed evenly across four runs. After the experimental session was
complete, participants were paid according to the actual outcomes ac-
cumulated over 80 trials of the task. In addition, subjects completed
a postscan subjective rating questionnaire of “trustworthiness,” one
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Figure 1. (A) Decision tree and (B) exemplar trial design showing four potential outcomes TRUST-Reciprocate; TRUST-Defect;
KEEP-{Reciprocate}; KEEP-{Defect}. Payoff shown within box represents subjects’ actual payoff, whereas the other payoff represents
what would have been received if alternative action were chosen (hypothetical payoff).
rating for each type of DM2 (“How much do you trust this per-
son?”) on a Likert scale of 1–10, anchored by the following descriptors
(1 = not at all trustworthy; 10 = extremely trustworthy).
IMAGE ACQUISITION AND PROCESSING
Scanning was performed with BOLD (blood oxygenation-level
dependent)-sensitive whole-brain fMRI on a 3.0 Tesla GE Signa
System (General Electric, Milwaukee, WI, LX 8.3, neuro-optimized
gradients); see Supporting Information for details. Preprocessing
steps were implemented using Statistical Parametric Mapping 5
software (SPM5; Wellcome Department of Cognitive Neurology,
London; www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). Preprocessing followed conven-
tional procedures: (1) slice time correction; (2) spatial realignment; (3)
normalization to the Montreal Neurologic Institute (MNI) template;
(4) spatial smoothing with an 8 mm kernel; (5) high-pass temporal fil-
tering (128 s). After preprocessing, statistical analyses were performed
at the individual and group level using the general linear model (GLM).
Regressors represented each partner type (COOPERATIVE, UN-
COOPERATIVE, NEUTRAL, computer) and the four types of out-
comes: (1) TRUST decisions in which one’s partner actually recipro-
cates (TRUST-Reciprocate) or (2) defects (TRUST-Defect), and (3)
KEEP decisions in which hypothetically one’s partner would have re-
ciprocated (KEEP-{Reciprocate}) or (4) would have defected (‘KEEP-
{Defect}’); here, curly parentheses represent the DM2’s hypothetical
choice had the participant chosen to TRUST. Regressors of interest
(condition effects) were generated from the onset of the outcome be-
ing revealed and were convolved with the HRF. In the second-level
analysis, subjects were treated as a random effect and images were
thresholded using a voxelwise threshold of P < .001 uncorrected with
a minimum cluster size of 237 voxels. This threshold was chosen using
AlphaSim[27] to correspond to a false positive rate of P < .05, corrected
for multiple comparisons across the whole brain.
Prior evidence suggest that the vSTR is most sensitive to the
relative difference between positive and negative outcomes[17] and be-
tween “High-Fairness” and “Low-Fairness” outcomes.[18] Therefore,
we were most interested in the differential activation to actual outcomes
(real MUs won or lost) that reflected instances when the partner recip-
rocated compared to those when the partner defected as represented
by the contrast Reciprocate > Defect following TRUST decisions.
We were less interest in hypothetical outcomes, because {Reciprocate}
and {Defect} outcomes following KEEP decisions do not represent
real gains or real losses, since the participant received 10 MUs regard-
less of partner responses. As such, we would not have expected vSTR
activation between these two fictive outcomes. Thus, first, in order
to measure the brain response to reciprocity, we searched the entire
brain for activations to positive versus negative partner feedback (Re-
ciprocate > Defect) following participant decision to TRUST. Second,
given our prior finding of modulation of the response to reciprocity by
partner type,[24] we performed whole-brain ANOVAs in the TRUST-
Reciprocate > TRUST-Defect contrast with partner type as the factor
for HC and GSAD groups to identify regions in which response to
partner reciprocity differed according to partner reputation.
Given our a priori hypotheses about the vSTR specifically, we
extracted parameter estimates (β weights, a.u.) for the TRUST-
Reciprocate > TRUST-Defect contrast for each individual subject in
HC and GSAD groups from an anatomical region of interest (ROI), en-
compassing the entire ventral and lateral region of the striatum derived
from the anatomical atlas of Tzourio-Mazoyer et al.[28] The resulting
β weights represent activation averaged across the entire anatomical
vSTR ROI, which were then analyzed with t tests. Second, in order
to examine how vSTR activation to reciprocity varied as a function of
partner type, we used this same anatomical ROI and extracted param-
eter estimates for each individual subject from the contrast of positive
and negative feedback (TRUST-Reciprocate versus TRUST-Defect)
for each partner type, which were then analyzed with ANOVAs and
follow-up t tests. Additionally, to examine functional clinical relevance
of vSTR function within the GSAD group, we computed Pearson
product–moment correlations between these β weights and social anx-
iety symptom severity as measured by the LSAS.
RESULTS
INVESTMENT BEHAVIOR IN RELATION
TO PARTNER TYPE
Participants in both groups accurately associated each
DM2 type with the corresponding likelihood for reci-
procity and adjusted their TRUST versus KEEP choice
accordingly, as indicated by participants’ differential in-
vestment behavior according to partner type (main ef-
fect of partner: F(2,140) = 116.397, P < .001), which did
not differ between HC and GSAD participants F(1,70)
= 0.371, P = .54 (Fig. 2A). Learning occurred rapidly
(Fig. 2B), with differential investing based on partner
type observed on average by the fifth trial, and stabilizing
thereafter. The subjective rating of “trustworthiness” for
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Figure 2. Behavioral results for healthy participants (top panel) and individuals with generalized social anxiety disorder (GSAD) (lower
panel). (A) Participants in both groups chose to Trust COOPERATIVE more often than UNCOOPERATIVE, NEUTRAL, and
COMPUTER partners (COOPERATIVE > NEUTRAL = COMPUTER > UNCOOPERATIVE, *P < .05); (B) trial-to-trial trust
behavior (proportion “Trust” decisions collapsed across subjects) for each partner type over 20 trials during the fMRI experiment; (C)
Participants in both groups perceived COOPERATIVE partners to be more “trustworthy” than UNCOOPERATIVE and NEUTRAL
partners based on subjective ratings collected after fMRI scan (*P < .05).
each DM2 partner type was consistent with investment
behavior, showing a significant main effect of DM2 part-
ner type (HC: F[2,52] = 18.1, P < .001; GSAD: F[2,68] =
64.2, P < .001); subsequent t-tests revealed that both
HC and GSAD subjects perceived COOPERATIVE
(> NEUTRAL > UNCOOPERATIVE) partners as
most “trustworthy” based on subjective ratings collected
after scanning (all t tests: P < .05; Fig. 2C).
BRAIN RESPONSE TO RECIPROCITY
FOLLOWING TRUST AND KEEP DECISIONS
In whole-brain, voxelwise neuroimaging analysis of
the TRUST-Reciprocate > TRUST-Defect contrast,
we observed robust activations in bilateral vSTR, a
region known to signal reward and pleasure,[29–31] in
both HC and GSAD groups (Fig. 3; Table 1). In ad-
dition to vSTR, additional activations were observed
in healthy participants in inferior occipital gyrus, me-
dial frontal gyrus/orbitofrontal cortex, precentral gyrus,
and cerebellum; and in GSAD participants in inferior
occipital gyrus, medial frontal gyrus/orbitofrontal cor-
tex, middle and superior frontal gyrus, precuneus, and
cerebellum (Table 1). In the reverse contrast of TRUST-
Defect > TRUST-Reciprocate, no significant activa-
tions were observed in either HC or GSAD groups. In
the between-group contrast of HC versus GSAD groups
in the TRUST-Reciprocate > TRUST-Defect contrast,
no differences between groups were observed.
To clarify and complement the whole-brain analyses,
we also extracted β weights and analyzed the nature and
direction of activation for the TRUST-Reciprocate and
TRUST-Defect conditions separately from anatomi-
cally derived vSTR ROIs. Between outcomes, t tests of
Figure 3. Whole-brain results for healthy participants (top panel)
and individuals with generalized social anxiety disorder (GSAD;
lower panel). Both groups demonstrated discrete and robust ac-
tivation to positive reciprocity (TRUST-Reciprocate > TRUST-
Defect contrast) in bilateral ventral striatum. Results displayed
on a canonical T1 brain template (all activations are dis-
played at whole-brain voxelwise P < .05, corrected for multiple
comparisons).
these parameter estimates revealed significantly greater
vSTR activation following TRUST trials in which the
partner reciprocates compared to trials in which the
partner defects in both HC and GSAD groups (Fig. 4;
Table 1), but that these activations did not differ between
groups. In sum, these results show a robust vSTR re-
sponse to positive feedback (Reciprocate > Defect) sim-
ilarly in both healthy individuals and individuals with
GSAD.
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TABLE 1. Results for anatomical regions of interest in left and right striatum
HCs (n = 36) GSAD (n = 36)
Left striatum Right striatum Left striatum Right striatum
Outcome β β β β
T-R 0.18 (.06) 0.09 (.06) 0.12 (.05) 0.08 (.06)
T-D − 0.07 (.07) − 0.13 (.07) − 0.12 (.08) − .15 (.09)
Outcome comparisons T score P-value T score P-value T score P-value T score P-value
T-R > T-D 3.55 <.001 3.31 <.01 3.54 <.001 3.13 <.01
T-R > T-D by partner type β β β β
C 0.38 (.09) 0.34 (.08) 0.24 (.10) 0.30 (.09)
U − 0.08 (.15) − 0.08 (.14) 0.30 (.18) 0.27 (.18)
N − 0.02 (.14) − 0.05 (.12) 0.15 (.09) 0.18 (.09)
Com 0.15 (.15) 0.18 (.14) 0.22 (.14) 0.16 (.18)
Partner type comparisons T score P-value T score P-value T score P-value T score P-value
C > U 3.12 <.01 2.82 <.05 − 0.17 n.s. .28 n.s.
C > N 3.01 <.01 2.72 <.05 0.90 n.s. .73 n.s.
U > N − 0.67 n.s. − 0.80 n.s. 1.96 .05 .91 n.s.
β, average activation in arbitrary units within the anatomic ROI; T-R, TRUST-Reciprocate; T-D, TRUST-Defect; C, cooperative; U, uncooper-
ative; N, neutral; Com, computer; HC, healthy control; GSAD, generalized social anxiety disorder.
BRAIN RESPONSES TO RECIPROCITY BY
PARTNER TYPE
Given our previous finding that partner reputation
modulates vSTR activation in the TRUST-Reciprocate
> TRUST-Defect contrast,[24] we next examined how
these vSTR responses are modulated by partner repu-
tations for cooperation associated with different DM2
partner types. Specifically, we extracted parameter es-
timates of activation for each of the four DM2 part-
ner types from the anatomical vSTR ROIs for the
TRUST-Reciprocate > TRUST-Defect contrast. In
healthy participants, a one-way ANOVA showed a sig-
nificant main effect of partner type on striatal responses
(F[5,115] = 5.48, P < .001). Follow-up t-tests revealed sig-
nificantly greater vSTR activation to COOPERATIVE
than to UNCOOPERATIVE (P < .05) and NEUTRAL
(P < .05) partners bilaterally (Fig. 5; Table 1), as pre-
viously reported in reference24. In GSAD, a one-way
Figure 4. Ventral striatum region of interest analysis for healthy participants (top panel) and individuals with generalized social anxiety
disorder (GSAD; lower panel). In both groups, left and right ventral striatum exhibit a positive response (“activation”) to reciprocity
following trust decisions (TRUST-Reciprocate) and a negative response (“deactivation”) to defection following trust decisions (TRUST-
Defect) (TRUST-Reciprocate > TRUST-Defect, *P < .05).
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Figure 5. Ventral striatum region of interest analysis for healthy participants (top panel) and individuals with generalized social anxiety
disorder (GSAD; lower panel) stratified by partner type. In healthy participants, activation in both left and right ventral striatum in
response to partner reciprocation compared to partner defection following TRUST decisions is selective for COOPERATIVE partners
(COOPERATIVE > UNCOOPERATIVE and COOPERATIVE > INDIFFERENT, *P < .05, **P < .01. In individuals with GSAD,
activation in both left and right ventral striatum was not modulated by partner type.
ANOVA revealed the main effect of partner type was
not significant (F[5,115] = 5.48, P = .274). Follow-
up t-tests revealed a significant difference between re-
sponses to UNCOOPERATIVE versus NEUTRAL
partners in left striatum only (P = .05); otherwise
there were no significant differences between any part-
ner types in either striatum (Fig. 5; Table 1). We
next tested the Group × Partner Type interaction in
striatal responses. This revealed an interaction with
trend-level significance (F[5,255] = 3.08, P = .12), sug-
gesting that striatal responses to human partners dif-
fered across the two groups. Follow-up tests for Group
× Partner Type interactions examined differences be-
tween the groups in striatal responses to pairs of
partners. These tests found trend-level evidence that
HC versus GSAD differed in terms of responses to
COOPERATIVE versus UNCOOPERATIVE part-
ners and COOPERATIVE versus NEUTRAL part-
ners (COOPERATIVE versus UNCOOPERATIVE:
P = .14; COOPERATIVE versus NEUTRAL: P = .11).
More specifically, healthy participants were more re-
sponsive to COOPERATIVE partners than UNCOOP-
ERATIVE and NEUTRAL partners, whereas GSAD
did not exhibit this difference.
Finally, given our finding that reputation modulated
responses to reciprocation in the HC group but not in
the GSAD group, we examined if vSTR function in the
GSAD group would relate to clinical state. Within the
GSAD group, we correlated brain responses to recipro-
cation (>defection) for each partner type with scores on
the LSAS, a measure of social anxiety severity. We found
Figure 6. In participants with generalized social anxiety disorder
(GSAD), higher Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale (LSAS) scores are
associated with reduced responses in right striatum to coopera-
tive partners, r = −.47.
that among individuals with GSAD, greater symptom
severity was associated with diminished vSTR responses
to COOPERATIVE partners (right: r = −.47, P = .004;
left: r = −.268, P = .12; Fig. 6).
DISCUSSION
Using event-related fMRI and a novel neuroeconomic
task in healthy and GSAD groups, we investigated dif-
ferences in the neural correlates of reciprocity dur-
ing iterative economic exchanges with fictive partners
who develop different reputations for repaying (or not
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repaying) the investment entrusted to them. We pre-
viously demonstrated that in healthy individuals, vSTR
activates to reciprocation from partners who have con-
sistently returned the investment (“cooperative” part-
ners), and is absent for partners who lack a reputation
for cooperation,[24] suggesting that this might be an im-
portant mechanism for initiating and maintaining coop-
erative social relationships. Here, we show that in in-
dividuals with GSAD, this modulation of vSTR reward
signals by partner reputation is absent. These findings
extend previous studies that have investigated GSAD us-
ing primarily static, noninteractive stimuli. In addition,
they show that neuroeconomics could be an important,
informative new paradigm for elucidating novel behav-
ioral and brain mechanisms in GSAD during more eco-
logically valid dynamic, ongoing social interactions.
Human beings are prosocial animals who face mul-
tiple challenges in navigating highly complex social
landscapes.[32] One challenge consists in identifying co-
operative partners with whom to form long-term so-
cial relationships, avoiding uncooperative individuals
who show a proclivity to defect,[33] and the brain’s
striatal reward center has increasingly been impli-
cated in these functions.[13, 15] We have previously
shown that people’s preference for fair and equitable
outcomes,[18, 21] and their ability to track the repu-
tations of partners based on prior actions[16, 17, 22, 23]
interact within the striatal reward system.[24] In
particular, vSTR responses to outcomes involving re-
ciprocation are enhanced with partners with a prior rep-
utation for reciprocation compared to partners who lack
such a reputation, and this finding has been confirmed by
other groups.[25, 26] These consistent results suggest that
vSTR modulation by partner reputation may be an im-
portant mechanism to support the formation and main-
tenance of cooperative relationships by providing an en-
hanced automatic, internal reward signal in the context
of positive outcomes that occur specifically with cooper-
ative partners. This can be advantageous evolutionary,
since these partners have demonstrated a track record of
cooperation, and will presumably produce positive recip-
rocal outcomes in the future. In other words, this could
represent neural mechanism for differentiating the value
of those who have shown to be cooperative and trustwor-
thy from those who have gained the opposite reputation.
In the present study, we found evidence that in GSAD,
the modulation of vSTR reward signals by partner repu-
tation is absent—striatal reward signals to reciprocation
did not differ according to whether one’s partner had a
prior reputation for cooperation or lacked such a reputa-
tion (Fig. 5). That is, our results suggest that individuals
with GSAD show a similar vSTR reward response to a
positive reciprocity outcome (i.e., TRUST-Reciprocate)
from all types of partners, regardless of the partner’s
prior proclivity, or lack thereof, for reciprocity. Inter-
estingly, the extent of symptom severity in GSAD par-
ticipants negatively predicted responses to cooperative
partners in both right (Fig. 6) and left striatum. In partic-
ular, those with more social anxiety symptoms mounted
the least vSTR response, suggesting that the processing
of social reward from trustworthy partners may be re-
lated to severity of the illness. Of note, we did not find
that partner defection activated fear-related neurocir-
cuitry in amygdala and insula in either HC or GSAD
groups (Table 1), consistent with our prior findings[24]
and the findings of other groups,[16, 17, 34] highlighting
a potentially distinctive role for vSTR in dynamic so-
cial decision making. These results thus add to a body
of neuroimaging evidence that suggests that in addition
to well-known abnormalities in threat processing cir-
cuits located in amygdala and insula,[12] GSAD is also
associated with abnormalities in striatal mediated reward
function.[35–38]
Previous neuroimaging studies have shown that
socially shy adults[36] and behaviorally inhibited
adolescents[37, 38] exhibit enhanced sensitivity to rewards
in the striatum. These findings have been interpreted by
these authors in terms of hypersensitivity to receipt of
contingent rewards, that is, rewards whose receipt is not
guaranteed but rather depends on one’s choosing the
correct actions,[37] or to a more nonspecific state of gen-
erally increased arousal to incentive cues.[38] Applying
a similar interpretation to the present study, it may be
that in healthy individuals, rewards from partners with-
out a prior history of reciprocation lose their salience. In
individuals with GSAD, however, perhaps due to a gen-
eralized state of hyperarousal, these rewards continue to
remain inappropriately salient. This is consistent with
behavioral findings that GSAD individuals inappropri-
ately remain tense and hyperaroused during social inter-
actions more broadly.[39, 40]
An alternative hypothesis interprets the results of the
present study in terms of deficits in being able to differen-
tiate others based on their prior actions and/or in being
able to use this discriminative information to generate
implicit biasing signals during social decision making.
The ability to rapidly and accurately detect and discrim-
inate social partners in terms of prosocial reputation[33]
is a useful skill that might facilitate better choices of so-
cial partners, and thus an enhanced sense of confidence
and trust in partners that have been selected. We had
previously shown that GSAD subjects fail to engage the
dorsal medial prefrontal cortex when “mentalizing,” the
sociocognitive process of making inferences about the
motives and intentions of social partners to guide ap-
propriate behaviors, during the Trust Game.[41] Here,
the absence of modulation of reward signals by partner
reputation in GSAD may further reflect reduced ability
to discriminate reputations of social partners in GSAD or
to generate learning signals useful for biasing subsequent
decisions to cooperate or defect. Resulting impaired so-
cial decision making might in turn contribute to more
uncertainty, anxiety, and distrust during social situations.
It is noteworthy, however, that GSAD participants did
not differ from healthy individuals in terms of investment
behavior according to partner type, indicating they de-
coded reputations appropriately and used reputations to
guide behavioral choices (Fig. 2). It may be though that
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the striatal signals detected in this study represent largely
automatic and implicit biases, consistent with prior stud-
ies that implicate striatal regions in implicit learning pro-
cessing. Thus, it may be that these striatal signals did
not affect investment decisions in this relatively simple
investment task, but these signals may nonetheless play
a more important role in formation and maintenance
of relationships in more complex, ecologically realistic
situations, where reliance on automatic implicit cues is
thought to be far more prevalent and necessary.[42] In-
deed, one of the only other neuroimaging studies to ex-
amine striatal dysfunction in GSAD uncovered deficits
in striatal implicit learning processing.[35] Studies are
needed to investigate whether the pattern of striatal re-
sponses to partner reciprocity in GSAD uncovered in the
current study would affect investment behavior in social
contexts where implicit decision biases are known to be
more important.
In summary, this study extends previous work by using
a dynamic, interactive neuroeconomic task to investigate
ventral striatal reward processing during social decision
making. We found that in healthy individuals, the brain’s
reward center selectively responds to monetary rewards
received from partners with a reputation for cooperative
play (and not to partners who lack a cooperative rep-
utation), whereas in GSAD, the modulation of striatal
reward signals by reputation was entirely absent. This
study provides new insights into the brain basis of social
dysfunction in GSAD, and demonstrates that dynamic,
interactive task paradigms derived from economics can
help illuminate mechanisms contributing to pathology in
psychiatric disorders in which social dysfunction and/or
sociocognitive decision-making deficits are cardinal
features.
Acknowledgments. This research was supported
by NIH grant MH076198 and the Brain Research Foun-
dation Seed Grant to K.L.P. C.S.’s effort was supported
by the National Center for Advancing Translational Sci-
ences of the National Institutes of Health under Award
Number UL1TR000433 and NIH grant AA020297.
REFERENCES
1. Kessler RC, Berglund P, Demler O, et al. Lifetime prevalence
and age-of-onset distributions of DSM-IV disorders in the Na-
tional Comorbidity Survey Replication. Arch Gen Psychiatry
2005;62(6):593–602.
2. Stein MB, Stein DJ. Social anxiety disorder. Lancet
2008;371(9618):1115–1125.
3. Ruscio AM, Brown TA, Chiu WT, et al. Social fears and social
phobia in the USA: results from the National Comorbidity Survey
Replication. Psychol Med 2008;38(1):15–28.
4. Schneier FR. Clinical practice. Social anxiety disorder. N Engl J
Med 2006;355(10):1029–1036.
5. Alden LE, Taylor CT. Interpersonal processes in social phobia.
Clin Psychol Rev 2004;24(7):857–882.
6. Amir N, Elias J, Klumpp H, Przeworski A. Attentional bias
to threat in social phobia: facilitated processing of threat or
difficulty disengaging attention from threat? Behav Res Ther
2003;41(11):1325–1335.
7. Foa EB, Gilboa-Schechtman E, Amir N, Freshman M. Memory
bias in generalized social phobia: remembering negative emotional
expressions. J Anxiety Disord 2000;14(5):501–519.
8. Mogg K, Philippot P, Bradley BP. Selective attention to angry
faces in clinical social phobia. J Abnorm Psychol 2004;113(1):160–
165.
9. Hirsch CR, Clark DM. Information-processing bias in social pho-
bia. Clin Psychol Rev 2004;24(7):799–825.
10. Stopa L, Clark DM. Social phobia and interpretation of social
events. Behav Res Ther 2000;38(3):273–283.
11. Clark DM, McManus F. Information processing in social phobia.
Biol Psychiatry 2002;51(1):92–100.
12. Etkin A, Wager TD. Functional neuroimaging of anxiety: a
meta-analysis of emotional processing in PTSD, social anxiety
disorder, and specific phobia. Am J Psychiatry 2007;164(10):
1476–1488.
13. Rilling JK, King-Casas B, Sanfey AG. The neurobiology
of social decision-making. Curr Opin Neurobiol 2008;18(2):
159–165.
14. Montague PR, Berns GS. Neural economics and the biological
substrates of valuation. Neuron 2002;36(2):265–284.
15. Fehr E, Camerer CF. Social neuroeconomics: the neural cir-
cuitry of social preferences. Trends Cogn Sci 2007;11(10):
419–427.
16. King-Casas B, Tomlin D, Anen C, et al. Getting to know you:
reputation and trust in a two-person economic exchange. Science
2005;308(5718):78–83.
17. Delgado MR, Frank RH, Phelps EA. Perceptions of moral charac-
ter modulate the neural systems of reward during the trust game.
Nat Neurosci 2005;8(11):1611–1618.
18. Tabibnia G, Satpute AB, Lieberman MD. The sunny side of fair-
ness: preference for fairness activates reward circuitry (and dis-
regarding unfairness activates self-control circuitry). Psychol Sci
2008;19(4):339–347.
19. Schultz W, Dayan P, Montague PR. A neural substrate of predic-
tion and reward. Science 1997;275(5306):1593–1599.
20. O’Doherty JP, Buchanan TW, Seymour B, Dolan RJ. Predic-
tive neural coding of reward preference involves dissociable re-
sponses in human ventral midbrain and ventral striatum. Neuron
2006;49(1):157–166.
21. Tabibnia G, Lieberman MD. Fairness and cooperation are re-
warding: evidence from social cognitive neuroscience. Ann N Y
Acad Sci 2007;1118:90–101.
22. Krueger F, McCabe K, Moll J, et al. Neural correlates of trust.
Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 2007;104(50):20084–20089.
23. Singer T, Kiebel SJ, Winston JS, et al. Brain responses
to the acquired moral status of faces. Neuron 2004;41(4):
653–662.
24. Phan KL, Sripada CS, Angstadt M, McCabe K. Reputation for
reciprocity engages the brain reward center. Proc Natl Acad Sci
USA 2010;107(29):13099–13104.
25. Fareri DS, Niznikiewicz MA, Lee VK, Delgado MR. So-
cial network modulation of reward-related signals. J Neurosci
2012;32(26):9045–9052.
26. Fareri DS, Chang LJ, Delgado MR. Effects of direct social expe-
rience on trust decisions and neural reward circuitry. Front Neu-
rosci 2012;6:148.
27. Ward B. Simultaneous inference for fMRI data; 2000. Available
at: http://afni.nimh.nih.gov/pub/dist/doc/manual/AlphaSim.pdf.
28. Tzourio-Mazoyer N, Landeau B, Papathanassiou D, et al. Auto-
mated anatomical labeling of activations in SPM using a macro-
scopic anatomical parcellation of the MNI MRI single-subject
brain. Neuroimage 2002;15(1):273–289.
Depression and Anxiety
Klein Award Winner: Social Exchange Game 361
29. Schultz W. Multiple reward signals in the brain. Nat Rev Neurosci
2000;1(3):199–207.
30. Berridge KC, Robinson TE. Parsing reward. Trends Neurosci
2003;26(9):507–513.
31. O’Doherty JP. Reward representations and reward-related learn-
ing in the human brain: insights from neuroimaging. Curr Opin
Neurobiol 2004;14(6):769–776.
32. Richerson PR, Boyd R, Henrich J. Cultural evolution of hu-
man cooperation. In: Hammerstein P, editor. Genetic and Cul-
tural Evolution of Cooperation. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press;
2003:373–404.
33. Nowak MA, Sigmund K. Evolution of indirect reciprocity. Nature
2005;437:1291–1270.
34. King-Casas B, Sharp C, Lomax-Bream L, et al. The rupture and
repair of cooperation in borderline personality disorder. Science
2008;321(5890):806–810.
35. Sareen J, Campbell DW, Leslie WD, et al. Striatal function in
generalized social phobia: a functional magnetic resonance imag-
ing study. Biol Psychiatry 2007;61(3):396–404.
36. Hardin MG, Perez-Edgar K, Guyer AE, et al. Reward and punish-
ment sensitivity in shy and non-shy adults: relations between social
and motivated behavior. Pers Individ Dif 2006;40(4):699–711.
37. Bar-Haim Y, Fox NA, Benson B, et al. Neural correlates of reward
processing in adolescents with a history of inhibited temperament.
Psychol Sci 2009;20(8):1009–1018.
38. Guyer AE, Nelson EE, Perez-Edgar K, et al. Striatal functional
alteration in adolescents characterized by early childhood behav-
ioral inhibition. J Neurosci 2006;26(24):6399–6405.
39. Beidel DC, Turner SM, Dancu CV. Physiological, cogni-
tive and behavioral aspects of social anxiety. Behav Res Ther
1985;23(2):109–117.
40. Borkovec TD, Stone NM, O’Brien GT, Kaloupek DG. Evalu-
ation of a clinically relevant target behavior for analog outcome
research. Behav Ther 1974;5(4):503–513.
41. Sripada CS, Angstadt M, Banks S, et al. Functional neuroimaging
of mentalizing during the trust game in social anxiety disorder.
Neuroreport 2009;20(11):984–989.
42. Deutsch R, Strack F. Duality models in social psychology: from
dual processes to interacting systems. Psychol Inq 2006;17(3):166–
172.
Depression and Anxiety
